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I. INTRODUCTION
I was very grateful to receive an invitation to participate in the San
Diego symposium on equality. The gratitude was tempered, however, by my
realization that I had nothing of true value to contribute in terms of the deep
theoretical problems surrounding the use (or critique) of the term “equality.”
After all, “equality” has been the topic of systematic examination for roughly
2,500 years. More to the point, perhaps, is that I am scarcely an expert
myself in the vast, and ever-growing, literature on the subject. As true of
many other law professors, that has not kept me from writing several
essays that touch on the subject and opining on particular controversies.1 But
I am always aware that others, including fellow participants in the San
†
© 2022 Sanford Levinson. Prepared for presentation at the San Diego symposium
on equality. I am very grateful to Steve Smith and Larry Alexander for inviting me. And, as
always, I am immensely grateful to Jack Balkin and Mark Graber for their comments on
an earlier draft of this essay. More than ever, they should certainly be held harmless for
any problems in my argument or possible “crankiness” in its tone, though they certainly
deserve great credit in forcing me to try to become more clear and nuanced in setting out
my positions.
*
W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY (2003).
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Diego gathering, are vastly more aware of the formidable academic literature
than I am.
So perhaps this essay is best viewed as a “meta-essay” consisting of
reflections generated by almost four decades of teaching various facets of
the subject of “equality” within the particular context of the legal academy.
For reasons that should become obvious, I am not at all sure that my remarks
would be equally relevant had I continued to be only a member of a political
science department as a political theorist or were I a professional philosopher
teaching either undergraduates or graduate students themselves hoping to
spend their lives as philosophers. But it is a fundamental reality of the
legal professoriate that they are not teaching graduate students in any
conventional sense, beginning with the obvious fact that fewer and fewer
law students are likely to have any significant background in the relevant
literature on the subject of equality.
II. WHY IT IS DIFFICULT TO TEACH STUDENTS ABOUT “EQUALITY”
I organize my remarks around three propositions: First, as already noted,
“equality” is an enormously rich and complex issue, having challenged
the best philosophers and political theorists—and theologians—over more
than two millennia. Second, the task of “modern” professors of constitutional
law, dating back to the triumph of the “case method” in American legal
education, is to use their inevitably limited time to concentrate, almost
obsessively, on the work product of the United States Supreme Court.
This necessarily means emphasizing the opinions written by the judges
who happen, for whatever contingent reasons, to inhabit the bench at a
particular time. If a standard philosophy course might be titled “what important
philosophers have written about the subject of equality,” the law school
analogue is “what Supreme Court justices have opined as to the meaning
of equality, with an emphasis on the most recent justices and their work
products.” Third is the obvious truth that the writings of justices are
extremely different from what one might expect from philosophers or
political theorists—or, for that matter, theologians, for one of the few things
that most of us might agree on, whatever our profound differences, is that
justices are not selected for their position because of having demonstrated
the kind of philosophical acumen that explains the granting of tenure in
the academic world.
What lawyers think and say about equality is quite different from the
thought and writings of members of other parts of the modern university.
As Justice Kagan made clear in an opinion turning on the notion of “sovereignty,”
lawyers—or, at least the Supreme Court—address that complex concept
in a way quite different from academics, even if, it is worth noting, a particular
justice, like former Harvard Law School Dean Kagan herself, has had an
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unusually distinguished career within the legal academy.2 As she forthrightly
wrote, “Truth be told . . . ‘sovereignty,’” when used by the Supreme Court
to discuss “whether two governments are distinct for double jeopardy purposes
. . . does not bear its ordinary meaning.” Instead, “for whatever reason, the
test we have devised . . . overtly disregards common indicia of sovereignty.”3 One
might admire her candor—and the implications of the words “for whatever
reason”—while at the same time lamenting this almost cavalier disregard
of “common indicia of sovereignty.” Or, even more to the point, one
might strongly agree, as I do, with Don Herzog’s argument in his recent
book Sovereignty R.I.P., that the term has almost no value in the modern
world, which is very different, both intellectually and empirically, from
the 16th and 17th century European circumstances that generated the rich
discourses about “sovereignty” in such philosophers as Bodin and Hobbes.
He therefore argues that it should be dropped from academic—and, one
presumes, all other forms of—discourse trying to understand our own world
rather than the circumstances some four centuries ago that generated the
initial discourses. Yet no academic lawyer believes that Herzog’s advice
is even remotely likely with regard to the discourse of law, and we must
continue teaching about “sovereignty” even if our own private opinion is
that it is no more useful than phlogiston or “the ether” as a way of
understanding reality.
All of this raises a somewhat painful question. If application of the standards
of other intellectually rigorous disciplines like political theory or philosophy
might lead to the realization that emanations from the Supreme Court are
strikingly deficient, then why should students—and, necessarily, their
professors—spend so much time carefully parsing opinions that could in
fact not pass muster if presented in other parts of the university? Is it
sufficient simply to say that legal education is its own specialized area,
with its own internal standards of discourse as a means for grasping
the world? We need not believe that legal understandings—“thinking like
a lawyer”—provide the way of understanding the world in order to believe
that they are important roadways that are ignored by other valuable modes
of comprehension. From this perspective, then, perhaps it is a feature, and
not a bug, that the Court has created its own special understandings of such
concepts as “sovereignty” or “equality”—and, of course, there is a certain
connection between these once one begins talking about the “equal
2.
3.

See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. __ (2016), 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
Id. at 1870.
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sovereignty” of states in an international system or even of American
subnational “states” within our particular federal system.4
I will not take the space fully to “prove” these assertions. I hope the
following will suffice. As to the first, that is, the plentitude of rich materials
examining the concept of “equality,” I offer the results of a perfunctory
tour through my own library, which produced a number of scholarly books
with “equality” in their title. (I am obviously not including any references
to the works of the great philosophers themselves whose writings are the
foundation of most academic scholarship.). These include Sanford Lakoff,
Equality in Political Philosophy; Doug Rae et al. Equalities; Peter Westen,
Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of ‘Equality’ in
Moral and Legal Discourse; Charles Beitz, Political Equality; and Sidney
Verba and Gary R. Orren, Equality in America: The View from the Top.
There i s also an edited collection of essays, Equality and Preferential
Treatment. I shudder to think how many books might in fact be added through
a search of any university library, not to mention every book that in fact
contains serious discussion of “equality” whatever its title, such as, say,
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice,
or Michael Sandel’s recent attack on The Tyranny of Meritocracy.
There are also books that contain “inequality” in their title, such as
Christopher Jenck’s Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and
Schooling in America or a more recent book Framing Inequality: News Media,
Public Opinion, and the Neoliberal Turn in U.S. Public Policy, touching
on the way that members of a very different profession, i.e., journalists,
structure much of the public discussion of equality and inequality in
contemporary American society. Whatever their significant differences,
all manifest the practical reality that “equality” or its structural complement,
“inequality,” is what philosophers call an “essentially contested concept.”
This means not only that there are important variations among the authors
of even these relatively few books; there simply is not an agreed upon meaning
for the word. But it is also the case that the word itself—“equality”—at
least in the modern world has a positive valence, just as “inequality” for
many, has a negative tilt.5 That is, after all, one of the reasons why so much
4. See, e.g., Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529 (2013), which ultimately rests on what many regard as the judicially-manufactured
and ultimately incoherent doctrine of “equal state sovereignty.”
5. Thomas J. Main, in his The Rise of Illiberalism, shows that illiberal movements
in the United States and presumably throughout the world include a “rejection of the
proposition that all people are created equal,” in the specific sense of an entitlement to
what Main calls “political equality.” THOMAS J. MAIN, THE RISE OF ILLIBERALISM 16 (2022).
Main obviously recognizes what might be called the empirical problems attached to assertions
of radical equality, though even the emphasis on “political equality” is vitiated to some
extent by the fact that all political systems do in fact differentiate with regard to the opportunity
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energy is put into assertions about what constitutes the “correct” theory of
the concept. Something more than mere academic point scoring is thought
to ride on the answer.
Consider that Thomas Piketty became an international academic superstar
with his book on The Economics of Inequality, which for many triggered
an agreement that he had identified a genuine problem to which politicians
must respond. Ganesh Sitaraman’s contribution to a collection of essays,
Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, would have removed the question
mark. He wrote on “Economic Inequality and Constitutional Democracy”
and concluded that “[e]conomic inequality is a problem for constitutional
democracy” inasmuch as it “require[s] a relative degree of economic equality
to persist.”6 Generally speaking, it is regarded as a good thing in the United
States to be an egalitarian of some sort, especially if one wishes to be considered
a “progressive.” Abraham Lincoln is only the most noteworthy American
politician who emphasized the Declaration of Independence’s assertion
that “all [humans] are created equal,” which he used to criticize the ideology
behind slavery. But, of course, he never truly asserted that Blacks and whites
were truly equal across the legal board or, more ominously, that they could
necessarily live together in peace were slavery eliminated.
I almost always mentioned to students the importance of Equalities—
and the importance of its plural title—immediately after the Fourteenth
Amendment arrived in the course and served to initiate discussion of as
the explicit topic of equality. Rae and his colleagues demonstrate that there
are 108 logically defensible notions of “equality”; I go on to assert that
the text of the Constitution provides not a clue as to which is the “correct”
meaning and that we as Americans have never truly agreed on the “correct,”
or “best,” meaning. It is this fundamental reality that makes “originalism,”
whatever particular permutation of that doctrine one accepts, including

to participate in political decisionmaking., beginning most obviously with age. Consider
that the United States Constitution itself distinguishes between those citizens who are eligible
to become president on the basis of their status as “natural born citizens”; it also requires
naturalized citizens to wait seven and nine years, respectively, before they are eligible to serve
as representatives or senators, not to mention the reading by the United States Supreme
Court that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in effect acknowledges the legitimacy
of denying felons the right to vote. See the wooden textual opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist
in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
6. Gamesh Sitaraman, Economic Inequality and Constitutional Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 533, 548 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson,
and Mark Tushnet eds., 2018).
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“original public meaning,” basically useless as a means of resolving the
disputes generated by the term.
Perhaps the first meaning that might occur to someone, including our
students, is simply “treat everyone alike.” After all, as St. Paul tells us
in Galatians 3:28, an essential text in Christianity, “all human beings are
equal in the eyes of God,” which to some might suggest that God does not
discriminate.7 But, to put it mildly, that view of a completely egalitarian
God seems to violate the beliefs of those Christians who believe that John
3:16 serves as the basic rationale for separating the sheep who will be
saved from the goats who will be subjected to eternal torments in hell that
await non-believers in Jesus as the Messiah. More to the point, such Olympian
detachment about what might differentiate human beings is certainly not
true of us mortals.
As an empirical matter, we are constantly seeking out differences among
us. Almost all of us readily agree that it would truly be senseless to adopt
“equality as identity” as a way to organize our complex social reality. To
treat everyone as if there were truly no differences would be a recipe for
social chaos. One of the first things we teach students is that there is a
difference between “legitimate” discrimination and its “invidious” counterpart.
We often use “discriminating taste” as a term of praise when referring to
selecting wines, restaurants, movies, and perhaps even friends and future
mates. Our students were, after all, admitted on the basis of a number of
differentiations, including grade point averages, LSAT scores, and I suspect
in all state universities, residence, to take three obvious—and relatively
uncontroversial—bases of what is, after all, discrimination. But all of us
are aware of the difficulties that ensue if we add race or ethnicity into the
mix, though not, apparently, athletic prowess or the fact that an applicant’s
parents or relatives might have attended the university in question. And,
of course, ability to pay is a key variable in terms of determining who actually
attends law school, even given the scholarship programs present in many
law schools. In any event, we are off and running into trying to discern
the difference between allowable distinctions and ones that arguably should
be condemned as unacceptable and therefore forbidden in a just society.
One of the difficulties, as Rae and his colleagues in effect point out, is
that debates about equality often break down into the equivalent of shouting
matches between proponents of theories #24, 37, and 73 among the 108
logically possible candidates. It is not only the case, as is often suggested,
that there is a tension between equality and liberty. That simply invites
argument as to the comparative weight of two important conflicting values.
Rather, the shouting match is caused by the sincere belief of all of the

7.
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proponents that their particular favorite among the 108 is the correct theory
and, therefore, that their adversaries must either be stupid or simply engaging
in motivated reasoning in order to achieve their own crass interests. After
all, Sitaraman’s call for greater economic equality may leave untouched
other forms of inequality, as suggested years ago in Michael Walzer’s
Spheres of Justice. Equality of access to medical care, say, implies nothing
at all about similar access to skiing vacations in Switzerland or the ability
to purchase delicious delicacies instead of being confined to a less expensive
diet—or, perhaps, the ability to purchase graduate education in non-obviously
utilitarian pursuits like classical languages or medieval art.
As to the second of my three assertions, about the felt necessity to focus
on Supreme Court opinions, I call simply on the “lessons of experience,”
as the Framers might have—and indeed did—put it. I am assuming that
many of my readers have been called upon to teach within a law school
setting those aspects of constitutional law that include the Fourteenth
Amendment and the presumptive meaning of “equal protection of the
laws.” That obviously requires constructing a syllabus and deciding what
materials on which to spend very scarce and precious class time. Each
syllabus, in its own way, constructs its own “canon” as to what we believe
well-educated students ought to know. As we all know, every item that
we in fact assign requires the ruthless rejection of many other worthy competitors.
To what degree can we—or should we—more-or-less ignore so-called “leading
cases” of the Supreme Court, particularly if they are quite recent and the
subject, say, of newspaper editorials, political debate, and maybe even
symposia at law schools? As the co-editor of what is said to be one of the
“leading” casebooks in the field, which I would like to believe is interestingly
different from most of its competitors by being more self-consciously
“theoretical,” I can speak to the pressures to focus not only on the general
handiwork of the United States Supreme Court, but also its more recent
cases. This is registered in the reality of the importance of the annual
“supplements” that are issued by most casebook editors.
Many contemporary cases often have as their ostensible subject “equality,”
and we therefore dutifully include them in the Casebook, including, say,
the tandem cases involving affirmative action at the University of Michigan,
Gratz8 and Grutter.9 It would, presumably, be scandalous to omit Brown

8.
9.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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v. Board of Education10 from a casebook—or from most course syllabi. It
is, after all, what Jack Balkin and I identified some years ago as part of
the “cultural canon” of constitutional law cases that we seem obligated to
transmit to our students if they are not to embarrass themselves at dinner
parties, or perhaps job interviews, by admitting to ignorance of the case.11
The point of our essay, which is relevant to this one as well, is that there
are in fact multiple canons. We focused particularly on three: the “pedagogical
canon” that demands being taught to students as fledgling lawyers; the
“cultural literacy” canon that Americans might be expected to have at least
minimal familiarity with, especially, but not limited to, lawyers; and then
the “constitutional theory” canon that identifies the materials that legal
academics make the subjects of their own professional reflections. This last
might well interest few students, judges, or professional lawyers, even though
proficiency in this particular canon may dictate whether someone is hired
or receives tenure in the academy. Needless to say, we did not argue that
there is necessary agreement on the content of the three, only that it is
important to realize that there are significant differences among the materials
that we might assign to the three boxes.
But, as a segue to my third assertion, the principal thing anyone teaching
the two Michigan cases or Brown itself realizes is they make relatively little
sense if one expects a truly coherent argument that, among other things,
allows one to offer fairly confident assertions either as to what exactly
explains the opinions written to justify the Court’s decision or about what
might follow from accepting them as authoritative. With regard to GratzGrutter, the central reality is that seven of the nine justices clearly believed
that it made no sense to decide them differently in terms of accepting or
rejecting the programs being litigated. The problem is that they split 4-3
in how they would have decided the two cases, but they all agreed that the
two plans involving undergraduate admissions and applicants to the Law
School should have survived or died together. Justices O’Connor and Breyer,
of course, begged to disagree. This meant that the Law School prevailed
by a 5-4 vote, while the undergraduate college was chastised by a 6-3 vote.
How many of us, I can only wonder, take the distinctions discerned by
O’Connor and Breyer seriously? Perhaps we can “teach” those distinctions
in the same way that grammarians can teach students learning English as
a second language how to conjugate the irregular verbs. It may make no
sense not simply to add “ed” to the present tense of the verb in question,
but that is the way we do things when speaking or writing English. One
must commit the practices—they are not really “rules,” of course—to
10. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Country, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963 (1998).
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memory, and perhaps that is simply what we ask students to do with regard
to distinguishing between Gratz and Grutter in their application of purported
notions of “equal protection under law.” In any event, we should ask
ourselves what, exactly we think our students are supposed to learn from
the careful study of both of the cases, beyond the importance of judicial
idiosyncrasy in multi-member decision-making bodies. And, of course, we
can then add to their frustration by assigning the two later cases involving
Abigail Fisher and her anguished attempts to achieve her dream of attending
my home institution, the University of Texas Law School. Perhaps the main
thing we must teach our students is that deviations from a relentlessly—
and itself dubious—process of “meritocracy” can be justified only by reference
to a magic word, “diversity,” which itself requires that one recognize that
we are in fact not all alike. Many years ago, I compared lawyers to participants
in the childhood game of “Simon says,” where sometimes inane instructions
must be followed on pain of losing the game. So it is with clothing policies
almost always decided on for a complex set of reasons in the singular garment
of “diversity,” whether one believes that genuinely makes good sense or
not.12
Nicholas Lemann recently wrote an illuminating essay in The New Yorker
on the Court’s treatment of affirmative action, in which, among other
things, he interviewed Justice Lewis Powell’s law clerk, Robert Comfort,
on the process of decision and opinion writing in Bakke.13 What Comfort
made absolutely clear is that Powell was after a workable “compromise”
rather than a necessarily intellectually elegant answer. That compromise
was found in the idea of “diversity,” emphasized in a brief submitted by
Harvard and, apparently, encouraged by a slim book about the travails of
two relatively “liberal” universities in apartheid South Africa.14 Reflecting
on the Powell opinion that he helped to draft, Comfort conceded, “It was
not the most elegant piece of legal reasoning, but it was the right result. . . .
We had saved the country from another civil war. The academic reactions,
on both sides, were very harshly critical. Sometimes the right answer is
not the intellectually defensible answer. It’s not the lawyerly answer. It’s
a compromise. A lawyer [including, presumably, a lawyer serving on the
Supreme Court] isn’t interested in producing the clearest opinion. He

12.
13.
14.
2021).

See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, in WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 11 (2003).
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See Nicholas Lemann, The Diversity Verdict, NEW YORKER 34–45 (Aug. 2,
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wants to produce the best result.”15 I shall return to this defense of Powell’s
opinion in Bakke below.
With regard to Brown, it is important, presumably, to realize that the
politically sagacious Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had been a wildly
popular bipartisan governor of California, knew exactly what he was doing.
He very consciously penned a “non-accusatory” opinion that he hoped
(wrongly) might be relatively well-accepted by the white Southerners who
had been complicit for decades in creating and maintaining a ruthless
system based on white supremacy. But it was also crucial to gain not only
majority assent, but, rather, unanimous approval, including the vote of the
Kentuckian Stanley Reed, who basically appears to have believed that
Plessy v. Ferguson should still be accepted as binding precedent.16
Warren was not submitting his opinion to a law school seminar. He
would also presumably be indifferent to the fact that, for me at least, the
opinion is a nightmare to teach decades later. Students who brief the case
may ascertain the fact that schools were segregated by race in seventeen
states, including Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, and Kansas, and the
accompanying case of Bolling v. Sharpe provides the additional information
that schools were also segregated in our nation’s capital. However, there
is no useful information that allows students ignorant of American history
to understand why the schools were segregated in these localities. Nothing
is said about slavery, the failed attempt at genuine “reconstruction” of the
defeated Confederacy, or even Jim Crow, even if we are told, with reference
to some controversial social psychology experiments, that separating
children on the grounds of race is likely to inflict psychological harm.
Doctrinally, the opinion is a mess, sending conflicting messages first that
“separate schools are inherently unequal” and then, only a paragraph later,
informing us that the key question is really whether the separate schools
are the result of intentional decisions to distinguish among the children
solely because of their race. Readers may feel legitimately confused as to
what counts as unconstitutional “segregation” or even exactly why we should
care about “racially separate schools,” which are apparently tolerable so long
as they are not intended by the school board in question.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the Supreme Court itself basically engaged
in a shouting match on the “true meaning” of Brown over fifty years later
in a case involving the voluntary desegregation of schools in Seattle,
Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, both of which involved taking the

15. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
16. See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES
187–205 (Paul Gewirtz and Peter Brook, eds., 1996).
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race of the students into account.17 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer
appeared to accuse each other of lawyerly incompetence in understanding
the basics of that truly canonical, albeit incoherent, case. What should our
students think of such a display? I can report that a group of New Zealand
judges to whom I gave a talk about Parents Involved in the summer of 2007
were dismayed by the unedifying spectacle of the dueling opinions and
their tone. They commented that the American experience following the
constitutionalization of “equality” was a contributing reason to the fact
that the New Zealand Bill of Rights, a quasi-constitution for that country,
avoids using that word. From their perspective, the United States presents
a chastening, rather than inspiring, example of constitutional drafting—and
judicial interpretation. Better to avoid the de facto constitutionalization
of “equality” than to risk going down the American rabbit hole of apparently
endless disputation and acrimony.
These are not isolated examples of what faces any law professor charged
with teaching about “equal protection of the law.” I am even more perturbed
about another line of cases that interest me as a citizen as well as a law
professor, involving the distribution of political power in the United States
through legislative districting. Prior to 1962, we might have taught our
students that the issue was nonjusticiable.18 But 1962 saw the great sea
change, with Baker v. Carr, which overruled Colegrove and held that
the citizens of Memphis, Tennessee, who claimed they were subjected to
unequal voting power stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.19
As with Brown, the Court provided no particular guidance in Baker as to
what exactly courts should do. That would presumably come later. My own
mentor in graduate school, Robert McCloskey, became the only non-lawyer
to contribute a “Foreword” to the Harvard Law Review’s annual issue on
the previous term of the Court, and he pleaded with the Court to craft a
basically modest and restrained path into what Felix Frankfurter had warned
was the “political thicket” of reapportionment.20 It obviously did not do
so. A 1963 case, arising out of Georgia, was the occasion of the Court’s
17. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
18. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Interestingly enough, the vote
was only 4–3, so perhaps that offers professors an opportunity to discuss whether such a
decision should be treated as in some way weaker or less binding than a 5–4 decision,
assuming, of course, that precedents should be treated as binding at all.
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
20. See Robert G. McCloksey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term: Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1962).
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thundering pronouncement that “[t]he concept of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can only mean one
thing—one person, one vote.”21 And the following year Reynolds v. Sims
invalidated the legislative systems of almost all of the states, many of
which replicated the national constitution inasmuch as the “upper house”
awarded equal numbers of senators to each country regardless of population.22
Thus the small North Carolina county in which I grew up had the same
single senator as did the county in which Charlotte, at least six time larger,
was located. The United States Senate was saved, as it were, only because
the Framers, in their unwisdom, specified in the text that each state received
two (and presumably only two) senators.
In 2002, I published a somewhat cranky article submitted as part of a
symposium at the University of North Carolina on the 40th anniversary of
Baker v. Carr.23 I in fact applauded Reynolds and agreed that the United
States Senate is illegitimate under any proper 21st century theory of equality,24
a view to which I am ever more committed. But I also indicated in 2002
that the Court’s slogan was simply a “mantra in search of meaning”; in no
serious sense had the justices conveyed to any intelligent reader an
articulation of what might count as a deep theory of political equality and
its connection with the all-important subject of political representation. I
cited one of my favorite articles, Jonathan Still’s essay in Ethics, in which
he demonstrated, at least to my satisfaction, that the most defensible meaning
of a truly “equal vote” entailed adoption of proportional representation.25
We have, though, repeatedly been told by all members of the Court, most
recently in an otherwise bitterly divided 5-4 decision on gerrymandering,26 that
proportional representation is most definitely not required by the mantra,
though without a scintilla of genuine explanation. Perhaps it is appropriate
to quote one of my favorite sentences in all of literature, Ring Lardner’s
“‘Shut up,’ he explained.”27
Similarly, Evenwel v. Abbott,28 another contribution of my home state
of Texas to the U.S. Reports, required the Court to address whether the

21. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
22. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80
N.C. L. Rev. 1269 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
25. Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1981).
See also Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985).
26. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
27. See RING LARDNER, SHUT UP HE EXPLAINED: A RING LARDNER SELECTION (1962).
28. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54 (2016).
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basis of representation should be citizens—and perhaps only those citizens
actually entitled to vote—or, rather, the population in general, including
many thousands who are ineligible to vote because of age, status as felons,
or, most prominently, lack of citizenship (including residents who are also
at the same time undocumented aliens). Not at all coincidentally, the same
zealot who has financed attacks on affirmative action, including that at the
University of Texas, was behind Evenwel. The plaintiffs were arguing, in
effect, that Houston, the nation’s third-largest city, should not be rewarded
with extra representation in the Texas legislature because of its significant
cohort of non-citizens, whether resident aliens or undocumented aliens.
Whatever one thinks of the argument, it can scarcely be dismissed as “frivolous”
inasmuch as it goes to the root of what one means by “representation.”
Justice Ginsburg in a quite wooden opinion for the Court declared that
since we had always assigned all persons to the denominator for representation,
Texas was certainly not required to accept the plaintiff’s argument to
change the basis. This seems clearly correct, especially if one is a devotee
of relative judicial modesty, even if, needless to say, the reapportionment
decisions themselves scarcely comport with any such modesty. Justice Alito,
while concurring in the result, wrote an opinion accurately noting that the
issue was in fact quite an interesting one, at least if one linked “representation”
to the electorate, as one might believe was the message of Reynolds
and other cases. It was, therefore, unclear to him why a state could not
use as its “denominator” in crafting state legislative districts only citizens
or even citizens eligible to vote. (He apparently agreed that congressional
districting did require the counting of all “residents,” whether or not citizens.
But this can be interpreted simply as the submission to what I am sometimes
tempted to describe as “mindless textualism.”) That being said, though,
his opinion was more successful in spotting the issue, which Justice Ginsburg
basically ignored, than in attempting to provide any way of resolving one
of the most fundamental questions in all of political theory.
Ironically or not, Mark Graber, in a comprehensive forthcoming study
of the congressional debate over Reconstruction, notes that some Radical
Republicans were quite insistent on linking the number of representatives
a state would receive to the actual voting population. This followed from
the reality that by losing the War, Southern states might in fact gain significant
power in the House (and the electoral college) inasmuch as the three-fifths
clause became a nullity and the formerly enslaved persons were now counted
as whole persons. The key issue, of course, was whether or not these persons,
or, at least, the males among them, would be allowed to vote, and the answer
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was all too unclear at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was being
debated. “Proponents of congressional reconstruction were adamant,”
Graber writes, “that former confederate states not be allocated representatives
(and votes in the Electoral College) on the basis of disenfranchised persons
of color.”29 As Republican Representative Baker put it, “Who can stand
before the people of the North and tell them that the late rebel communities
in Congress ought, as a matter of right, to have between thirty and forty
Representatives in Congress upon no better basis than the unvoting and
therefore unrepresented colored people of the South?”30 As another Representative
put it, “Representation and the ballot must go hand in hand.”31
Today, of course, this position is thought to be decidedly illiberal, but
that may only be yet another illustration of what Jack Balkin has called
“ideological drift.” That is, positions that at one time were proffered by
people on one side of the political spectrum are now espoused by those on
the other and denounced by their original supporters. But this may also
illustrate the even more basic truth that all political reasoning is motivated
reasoning, so that any given argument, as proponents of the “Cambridge
School” identified with Quentin Skinner, has to be understood in the context
of the particular issues and political realities generating the text being studied.
This suggests, among other things, that the quest for a truly transhistorical,
universal theory of “equality” is a fool’s errand. The decision to embrace
any one of the 108 contenders will inevitably be a function of one’s response
to contingent “facts of the ground,” even if a specific argument will adopt
a purportedly universalist rhetoric. Even if one might want to challenge
this with regard to “pure philosophy,” it surely captures a fundamental
reality about legal argument, which must always take note of the actualities
generating any given case and of the consequences of any proffered solution.
In any event, we have entered the third decade of the 21st century with
the Court’s still having failed to produce anything that could possibly
count as a genuine elucidation of what it—or, for that matter, any individual
justice—has in mind when invoking a presumptively hallowed concept of
equality of the suffrage as a defining condition of the American political
system. One might ascribe this failure to the fact, however much we sometimes
wish to ignore it, that the Court, like all genuine institutions, is not an “it,”
but, rather, a “they.” So perhaps the real question is why we—or anyone
else—should expect genuine intellectual coherence from even a nine-member
body charged with reaching at least enough consensus to issue “opinions
29. MARK A.GRABER, PUNISH TREASON,REWARD LOYALTY:THE FORGOTTEN FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT I (U. Press of Kansas: Lawrence) (forthcoming 2023), at 297 (on file with
author).
30. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 463 (1866).
31. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319 (1866).
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of the Court” that, at least in theory, provide bureaucratic orders to those
the Constitution defines as “inferior” courts.
But one can also ask why anyone would expect even very smart judges,
educated at our finest law schools—such as the nine who now inhabit the
bench in Washington, eight of whom attended either Harvard or Yale law
schools—to be able to offer truly convincing resolutions of debates that
have challenged the best minds of the past 2,500 years. And this might
be especially true if legal education, including that delivered at our very
best law schools, makes no serious attempt to introduce its students, who
might later become even Supreme Court justices, to what Matthew Arnold
might have defined as the “best which has been thought and said” by the
truly eminent writers and thinkers in what we sometimes call “our
tradition.”
There is, incidentally, nothing innocent about this last observation.
No doubt an observer of my home library would take note of the fact
that it is basically lacking in any systematic examination of what anyone
outside of “Western political thought” might have said about equality.
Is it really the case that no one writing out of, say, Islamic, Indian, or
Chinese political thought, has had nothing of interest to say about this
topic? One might respond that American constitutional law should be
based exclusively on homegrown thinkers and ideas, which suggests, among
other things, that the “American idea of equality” might be interestingly
different from that found in, say, France, Germany, or Kenya. 32 Indeed,
federalism buffs might go on to suggest that there is a distinctly “Texan
theory of equality” that is importantly different from the variety one finds
in, say, Massachusetts or California. There is nothing stupid about such
suggestions, but it only underscores the difference between “thinking
like a lawyer” and “like a philosopher” who, for better or worse, generally
seeks more universal answers to important philosophical questions.
One might view most occupants of high office in the United States
as “gifted amateurs” with regard to the issues they are called upon to
resolve. For those in elective positions, their legitimacy is derived from
the sheer fact of election. It is, of course, more difficult to figure out
exactly what legitimizes judicial decisionmaking by nonelected jurists.
This is especially true in a post-realist world that is skeptical of the
existence of a teachable “legal science” instantiated in the decisions of
judges. At the very least, that might require adopting a more European
32.

See, e.g., DONALD LUTZ, A PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY (1992).
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mode of organizing the judiciary so that judges are truly “professional”
insofar as they are trained for that role even from their basic legal education.
That, obviously, is in no way true of American judges, whether appointed
or elected. Interestingly enough, Elena Kagan is the only one of the
current members of the Supreme Court who is certifiably “learned in
the law.” And that is not because she was Dean of the Harvard Law
School; rather, it is because, in order to become Solicitor General of the
United States, she had to assure both the appointing President and the
confirming Senate that she indeed had that status! I have no idea if that
required anything more than possession of a law degree and, perhaps,
membership in a Bar. But such certification is irrelevant, at least as a
legal matter, to becoming a judge in the United States.
One’s qualifications for appointment have little or nothing to do with
the power one has as a judge after taking the oath of office, however.
Appointment to the office itself entitles the occupants to engage in
what philosophers call “performative speech,” i.e., the power to create
new legal realities simply by virtue of their uttering certain words.
And this is also the de facto power to force law professors to spend
significant time on their opinions whatever the professoriate might in
fact think of their quality. Nick Lemann captures this reality perfectly
with regard to the need of lawyers—and law professors—to concentrate on
the rhetorical use of “diversity” as another mantra; the sole reason is that
Justice Powell in 1978 found it an acceptable path toward a compromise
and then, twenty-five years later, Justice O’Connor, casting her own
idiosyncratic votes in Gratz-Grutter, proclaimed Powell’s view as
continuing to be the law of the land. We might on occasion indicate that
students should do a far better job if they wish to get an A on a seminar
paper, but that is irrelevant so far as determining the legal status of a
given Supreme Court pronouncement. Our students are far better advised
to obey Supreme Court opinions than any eviscerating critiques their
professors, who are distinctly not charged with, say, keeping the country
from falling into civil war, might in fact offer in our classrooms.
I am not a devotee of law and economics, but I am completely aware
that all of us, as actual teachers, operate under the duress of scarce
resources, the most important of which is time. Even law schools that
require courses in constitutional law generally require only one such
course. The University of Texas Law School is unusual inasmuch as we
require seven hours in two courses. However, there is no attempt genuinely
to standardize either of those courses. The first one is an “introduction” to
the subject for first-year students; the second is any course drawn from
a menu of options. What this means, in fact, is that it is perfectly possible
to graduate from the Law School without ever engaging in any truly extended
discussion of “the equal protection of the law,” if, for example, one has
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decided to take one’s second course on “freedom of speech,” “constitutional
criminal procedure,” or the topic that I increasingly focus on, “comparative
constitutional design.” Whether this is a feature or a bug of the triumph
of student choice regarding which courses they wish to take—and the
“academic freedom” of the professoriate to organize courses around
their own interests rather than conform to some set curriculum even with
an ostensibly single subject matter area—might itself be open to interesting
discussion, but there is no doubt that it is now a pervasive reality. Students
and faculty would, I suspect, join together in a common uprising against any
true uniformity in the curriculum!
So each and every one of us charged with teaching American constitutional
law, including whatever the Supreme Court might have to say about
“equality,” must necessarily decide exactly what to assign our students
and spend precious time discussing. It is hard to escape the zero-sum
aspects of designing a curriculum. More time spent on X will necessarily
mean less time on Y. I have become very critical of the fact that our
collective obsession with interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment has
meant, practically speaking, the diminished attention we are likely to
give to the structural features of the Constitution that may illustrate manifest
inequalities in our political system. The most obvious example is the
United States Senate, the patent inequalities of which I have come to
believe are far more important in explaining the possible collapse of
the United States as an operating political system than is anything the
Court says about the Fourteenth Amendment. But, of course, almost
no courses genuinely address why James Madison was completely correct in
describing equal voting power in the Senate as an “evil”33 because not
even Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules could present a plausible argument
that this evil is at the same time “unconstitutional.” One does not have
to be a committed textualist to believe that “What part of two do you
not understand” is a dispositive rejoinder to anyone who claims that
Wyoming’s enjoying equal voting power with California is unconstitutional
rather than “merely” an indefensible feature of the unamended 1787
Constitution. That is the teaching of Reynolds v. Sims34 itself inasmuch
as the Court completely backed off from addressing the illegitimacy of
the Senate under its own thundering standard of “one person/one vote.”
American legal education is simply uninterested in what is not subject
33.
34.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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to litigation, including basic institutional structures that violate any
plausible notion of equality in the 21st century.
Perhaps I should add a fourth assertion to my possibly sclerotic set
of assumptions about the challenge of being a legal academic charged
with the task of teaching about “equality.” That would be that our students,
with some welcome, but too infrequent, exceptions, do not bring with
them to law school the kind of educational background that might hold
us harmless, so to speak, in choosing to teach only the remarkably limited
material found in almost all law school courses. This, of course, has
nothing to do with their raw intelligence, which is often extremely
impressive, or even their dedication to “mastering the law” as defined
by diligence in performing their assignments. It does, however, relate
to the areas in which they majored prior to entering law school. Perhaps
there are a few schools where most of the admitted students have majored in
what we used to think were “traditional liberal arts,” including, say,
history, political science, or philosophy, but I dare say that that is an
ever-lessening group. Perhaps we get a good cohort of economics majors,
though that only invites discussion (and bickering) about the nature of
so-called “economic reasoning” either empirically or normatively. But
today students at “non-elite” schools are likely to major in business or
communication arts, not to mention those students who major in engineering
or other hard sciences that do not require any grappling with traditional
liberal arts subjects in order to get a degree. (Many of our students also have
extraordinarily little experience in writing serious papers that depend
on amassing relevant evidence and then developing a coherent and
well-developed argument about the implications of the evidence.)
In my now almost half-century of teaching, I have found the single
most difficult problem to be that of allusions: i.e., what can one expect
one’s students to be tolerably familiar with, whether from “high” or “popular”
culture, and what, instead, comes across to the student audience as a
sign simply of old age—who today really knows of Jefferson Airplane
or Richie Havens?—or a form of intimidation practiced by the selfprofessed well educated upon those with less education. Why should
we expect a student today to be able to identify Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Bentham, or even John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin,
and Robert Nozick, and to know the important differences among them?
Can we any longer presume that students will be able to identify Biblical
references or understand why Nelson Rockefeller included in his stock
campaign speech a reference to what political reporters reduced to
BOMFOG—the “Brotherhood of Man and the Fatherhood of God”?
Many of us have become sympathetic to concerns about “cultural
blindness” predicated on the often stunning lack of “our” own knowledge
about figures well-known to at least some of our students. Are we really
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entitled to be surprised by a student’s ignorance about John Locke?
Perhaps the reality of contemporary intellectual life, particularly in the
United States, is a “long melancholy roar” of not so much “ignorant armies”
clashing by night, but rather differentially educated armies who are
angry at what they view as the parochialism of those they are also perhaps
increasingly inclined to view as Schmittian enemies rather than members of
a common community united by a good faith desire to achieve the perhaps
utopian ends of the Constitution with regard, say, to “establishing Justice”
or achieving what some might define as the true “equal protection of
the laws.”
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Although there are moments when I am tempted to call for the radical
reconceptualization of the legal academy, I recognize not only that that
is completely unrealistic. More importantly, it also misses the fact that
there are good reasons why the study of law within that academy might
be interestingly different from the same study in other parts of the university
that, among other things, are not concerned with producing graduates
who are capable of practicing law. That being conceded, though, one can still
ask exactly why we approach the teaching of constitutional law the way we
do within the legal academy and whether significant changes—I would
call them “reforms”—are thinkable.
The first, and most important, question we must ask ourselves is exactly
what we think the purpose of the basic constitutional law course is.
One way of answering this is to ask further why it is that many, though
certainly not all, law schools require at least one course in constitutional
law while forgoing any such requirement with regard, say, to family
law, evidence, corporate law, taxation, or employment law. The answer
is surely not that these latter areas of law are less important to the practicing
lawyer than is constitutional law. As a matter of empirical fact, one
can predict that relatively few graduates of most law schools will find
themselves litigating the subjects covered in most constitutional law
courses. To the extent the typical graduate is likely to have a “constitutional
law” case, it is far more likely to involve the dormant commerce clause,
a topic rapidly fading as a central focus of most courses, constitutional
criminal procedure, or, of course, the kinds of constitutional law issues
that might come up if one is pursuing a career in state or local government,
e.g., zoning. Ironically or not, criminal procedure, including capital punishment,
has, generally speaking, been hived off to its own course, and many students
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graduate without ever confronting the issues raised, say, by the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth Amendments. For some lawyers, the First Amendment
will become implicated in cases involving intellectual property or the
regulation of social media, again topics that are rarely raised in the
introductory courses that are my primary interest. It is my experience
as well that most of “us” assume that our colleagues teaching property
will convey to students the morass of legal doctrine that is “land use
planning” and, especially, “takings.”
So let me turn to some quite specific suggestions, based on my own
experience. At the very least, I hope this might provoke a discussion
among legal academics about the single most important piece of legal
writing they do, which is to prepare a syllabus of the materials that they then
impose on students. For many years now I have refrained from teaching
Marbury v. Madison, which I regard as a vastly overrated case that contributes
surprisingly little to one’s legal education other than, probably, a certain
amount of cultural literacy.35 It would be embarrassing if presumably
well-trained lawyer said they never heard of the case. But that can be
accomplished in roughly ten minutes of comments. One certainly need not
take the time necessary to explain the specifics of the Election of 1800,
the “midnight judges,” and Marshall’s altogether questionable hermeneutics
when “interpreting” Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and then Article
III of the Constitution. As it happens, I use the time saved from spending
the three days necessary to teach Marbury adequately to students who are
unlikely to know any of the relevant history (or, for that matter, to be
familiar with hermeneutics) in order to teach far more important cases
involving the Constitution’s treatment of enslaved persons. And, of course,
it is slavery that is the historical predicate for the so-called Reconstruction
Amendments, including the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause.
So “equality” arrived as a central topic of discussion midway in the
courses I used to teach. What, indeed, does the concept mean, particularly
with regard to the issues of race and white supremacy that were the
foundation stone of the American form of chattel slavery? Several years ago
I proclaimed in the pages of a symposium devoted to teaching the
Fourteenth Amendment 36 that one could do an adequate job of teaching
everything students needed to know, in order to be “introduced” to the
conundra of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, by
35. Sanford V. Levinson, Why I Don’t Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans)
and Why You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003).
36. Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single
Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 603 (2018).
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concentrating exclusively on Strauder v. West Virginia,37 perhaps supplemented
by Plessy v. Ferguson.38 I will not rehearse my entire argument. But
I do believe that the relatively short opinion authored by Justice Strong,
together with the dissent of Justice Stephen J. Field, present a student
with the basic issues presented by the Equal Protection Clause, and that
almost literally none of the many cases decided since then do anything
really to clarify the difficulties set out in that case. It is not that Strong’s
opinion is truly coherent in the sense that it adopts only one theory of
equality. Indeed, what makes it so valuable pedagogically—and, I must say,
very much worth reading aloud and discussing each paragraph, and
sometimes even each sentence seriatim—is that it captures so well the
essential tension in approaching the Constitution’s meanings with
regard to using race as a predicate for public policy.
I have on occasion taken up to four days to work through the opinions in
Strauder, so valuable do I think the opinion is. But for now let me focus only
on one key paragraph, in which Strong elaborates what he believes to
be the “spirit and meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment and declares
that
It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall
be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored
race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The
words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,
— the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively
as colored, — exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy,
and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a
subject race.39

So one finds in this slender paragraph the two key theories of the Equal
Protection Clause that to this day are the subject of unending, and bitter,
contention. Does it prescribe that “the law in the States shall be the same
for the black as for the white,” which obviously sounds a lot like the
“color-blindness” test that John Marshall Harlan would contribute in
37.
38.
39.

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307–08 (emphasis added).
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his Plessy dissent. Or, very much on the other hand, does it distinctly
proscribe only “the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation”? The
former quite clearly would prohibit “affirmative action” which rejects
“sameness” as the overarching criterion for assessing the law regarding
race. The latter just as clearly can support affirmative action inasmuch as
it is distinctly “friendly” to the Blacks (and other groups) who have formerly
been excluded from the basically herrenvolk democracy established in 1787
and fully operative until at least 1865.
Plessy is interesting in this regard inasmuch as the majority opinion,
which a modern reader is thoroughly justified in regarding as exemplifying
an obtuse racism, nonetheless was careful to state, in response to an argument
that their operative doctrine would allow all sorts of discriminations beyond
segregated railway cars, “The reply to all this is that every exercise of the
police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted
in good faith for the promotion for the public good, and not for the annoyance
or oppression of a particular class.”40 Perhaps it is the very obtuseness of
the Court in failing to realize the degree to which Louisiana’s policy was
in fact designed “for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class”
that leads us to sympathize with Justice Harlan’s mantra about the Constitution
being “color-blind,” but what Strauder teaches is that the Constitution simply
does not offer a clear solution to the conundrum illustrated in Strong’s
paragraph. “Color-blindness” may be defensible as a prophylactic measure
based on the mistrust of federal judges or any other public officials (particularly
in the late 19th century?) to make nuanced judgment about the social meanings
of various classifications, racial and otherwise, but no one should pretend
that it is a compelled meaning of the “majestic generality” of “equal protection
of the laws.”
So why teach any of the further cases, especially, of course, if one agrees
that they are stunningly unilluminating save for revealing only the fissures
within the Court (and American society) themselves? The answer, presumably,
is that our students should know the legal languages (or jargon) that
contemporary judges use in approaching such problems. But I think
we should ask ourselves exactly why that is so important, especially if I’m
correct that very few of our students will actually have to write briefs or
make oral arguments that turn on decoding the mysteries found in Brown,
Gratz-Grutter, and the other cases that truly practicing lawyers do indeed
have to be aware of. But it might be independently valuable for students
to learn about the history of “diversity” as a mantra within the Supreme
Court as recollected by Justice Powell’s law clerk. How sensitive should
the Court be to the social ramifications of its decisions? Does it matter if

40.
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Justice Powell was correct in his belief that America was moving toward
a de facto civil war over the issue of affirmative action and that he might
contribute to some soothing of tensions by creating the decidedly “inelegant”
notion of “diversity”? A similar question can be asked, of course, about
the Court’s actions in Bush v. Gore, another controversial, shall we say,
exercise in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. By far the best defense
of that egregious decision was offered by former Judge Richard Posner,
who based his argument on the premise that the country was faced with a
genuine political-constitutional crisis that the Court, by its coup de main,
resolved. If one disagrees with Posner—or with Powell—is that because
one disagrees with them on the empirical assertions about the situation
being faced by the United States or, instead, because one believes that
such considerations ought to be irrelevant to justices whose oath is to be
loyal to the Constitution and not to adopt the role of basically political
decisionmakers? That is certainly a question that law students might find
worthy of debate, though not necessarily because it will make them better
lawyers as such.
Quite frankly, I think the only real defense of continuing to require
courses in constitutional law, given all of the courses and subject matters
that we do not require, is that an exposure to the history of American
constitutional development—itself profoundly different from a focus on
recent cases of the Supreme Court—helps to create better citizens. If it is
true, as Tocqueville and others have emphasized, that American society
looks to legal elites for guidance regarding fundamental social controversies,
then it is certainly important that these elites have at least some of the
relevant knowledge required to engage in their role as what some have
called “republican schoolmasters.” It is a further pathology of American
legal education that it provides no serious examination of what the document
might mean by requiring a “Republican Form of Government” of the
various states, thanks in part to the 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden that,
practically speaking, read the clause out of the Constitution by making it
non-justiciable. Ironically, Michael McConnell and others have argued that
the Reappointment Cases would make far more sense, theoretically, were
they based on the Republican Form of Government Clause, but that plea
has fallen on completely deaf ears.
In the “old days,” whether they were necessarily good or not, law schools
were far more authoritarian than they are now with regard to design of the
curriculum. But we have moved, with some exceptions, far closer to the
modern model of the university as cafeteria, with both the professoriate
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and the students allowed to pursue their own interests quite independent
of any institutional impositions. I have certainly benefitted from the freedom
accorded me; I would certainly object to being “forced” to waste my and
the students’ time with an extensive foray into Marbury or, just as importantly,
most of the contemporary handiwork of the Court. But perhaps we should
recognize that the freedoms we enjoy come with the price of a certain
incoherence in the very idea of “legal education,” especially with regard to
such a central—and often mysterious—concept as “equality.”
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